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Abstract 
Purpose – This work seeks to investigate post-crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to 
manage liquidity  risk.  It  is  based on the fact  that  the financial  liquidity  market  was greatly 
affected during the recent economic turmoil and financial meltdown. During the crisis, liquidity 
risk management disclosure was crucial for confidence building in market participants.  
Design/methodology/approach  – The  study  investigates  if  Basel  II  pillar  3  disclosures  on 
liquidity risk management are applied by 20 of top 33 world banks. Bank selection is based on 
information availability,  geographic balance and comprehensiveness of the language in which 
information  is  provided.  This  information  is  searched  from  the  World  Wide  Web,  with  a 
minimum of one hour allocated to ‘content search’, and indefinite time for ‘content analyses’. 
Such content scrutiny is guided by 16 disclosure principles classified in four main categories.
Findings – Only 25% of sampled banks provide publicly accessible liquidity risk management 
information; a clear indication that in the post-crisis era, many top ranking banks do not still take 
Basel disclosure norms seriously, especially the February 2008 pre-crisis warning by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. 
Implications/limitations  –  Bank  stakeholders  should  easily  have  access  to  information  on 
liquidity risk management. Banks falling-short of making such information available might not 
inspire confidence in market participants in events of financial panic and turmoil. Like in the 
run-up to the previous financial  crisis, if banks are not compelled to explicitly and expressly 
disclose what measures they adopt in a bid to guarantee stakeholder liquidity, the onset of any 
financial shake-up would only precipitate a meltdown. The main limitation of this study is the 
use of the World Wide Web as the only source of information available to bank stakeholders 
and/or market participants. 
Originality/value – The contribution of this paper to literature can be viewed from the role it 
plays in investigating post-crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to inform stakeholders on 
their management of liquidity risk.
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Paper type: Qualitative finance research paper
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1. Introduction
 Does the upper-bracket of financial institutions disclose easily accessible information? If 
it does, what and how much information does this “too big to fail”   category provide in terms of  
liquidity  management?  This  debate  has  taken  on  added  significance  with  increasing  global 
financial  integration  and  shortening  of  intervals  between  financial  crises.  Liquidity  Risk 
Management (LRM) has become increasingly vital in the banking industry, especially with the 
recent financial meltdown and economic down-turn. During the crisis, increasing credit concerns 
and  feeble  market  liquidity  animated  a  cycle  of  deteriorating  asset  market  values  and 
deleveraging. Authorities around the world sort for a solution as inter-bank lending came to a 
halt, credit risk and capital flight became common-place and banks were on their knees in search 
of liquidity. Many financial institutions were bailed-out or restructured. The inability of a bank 
to meet up with its financial obligation/liability is a premise on which crisis may result. This 
issue may be due to deterioration in asset quality or general loss of confidence in the financial 
institution due to circumstances more or less related to the bank in question. It therefore becomes 
imperial for banks to develop policies and standards that best measure and manage their liquidity 
positions on an on-going basis. More so, it is also necessary to project funding liquidity issues 
that could crop-up during a crisis event (stress testing and scenario analyses). As pointed out by 
Goodhart  (2008),  “liquidity  and  solvency  are  the  heavenly  twins  of  banking,  frequently  
indistinguishable. An illiquid bank can rapidly become insolvent and an insolvent bank illiquid”. 
As an extension the management of information asymmetry resulting from bank liquidity issues 
is crucial for the solvency and survival of the financial institution. 
This paper pieces together standard practices of bank LRM, while keeping a close eye on 
‘Basel II pillar  3’ disclosure criteria.  The reason the work looks up to Basel principles is, in 
February  2008  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  published  ‘Liquidity  Risk 
Management and Supervisory Challenges’[1] which somewhat predicted the financial crisis. The 
report emphasized that banks had failed to take account of a number of fundamental principles of 
LRM. It further stressed many financial  institutions did not conduct stress tests and scenario 
analyses because they did not consider severe and prolonged liquidity disruptions as very likely. 
The ensuing financial meltdown justified and gave much credit to this report. It is therefore our 
goal to investigate what post-crisis disclosure measures have been taken into account by top 
world banks. Findings shall be relevant to bank stakeholders as well as policy makers.
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The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. The introductory section is 
completed  with  an  academic  perspective  on  the  importance,  barriers  and  scope  of  risk 
management  disclosure.  Section 2 looks at  related literature,  our methodology is  outlined in 
Section 3, analysis of case studies presented in Section 4, and results are discussed in Section 5 
before a conclusion in Section 6. 
1.1 The importance of an evaluation framework for risk management disclosure
      The recent financial crisis took investors by surprise and reinforced the skepticism of the  
ability of financial institutions to self-regulate their risk disclosure principles adequately. In the 
heat  of  the  crisis,  some  regulatory  authorities  and  politicians  trumpeted  the  idea  that  risk 
disclosure practices of the hedge fund industry should be regulated. Therefore understandably, 
the  banking  industry  cannot  continuously  promote  self-regulation  without  significantly 
improving on the quality of risk management disclosure rules. This is primarily in the interest of 
bank stakeholders who through a pursuit of self-interest and benefits from higher growth tend to 
allocate their investments in the best risk-adjusted investment opportunities. Thus, stakeholders 
should be able  to  access  not only the bank’s risk but also its  risk management  process,  i.e. 
policies,  procedures…etc.  Recent  memory  provides  evidence  of  delayed  and  incomplete 
disclosure of risk information despite the crucial role the quality of risk management should play 
in  time  of  crisis  e.g.  Basel  Committee  2008  report  on  ‘Liquidity  Risk  Management  and 
Supervisory Challenges’.  
1.2 Barriers to an evaluation framework for risk management disclosure
     Supervisory authorities, the financial service industry and auditing firms agree that a risk 
management  standard  evaluation  framework  would  increase  the  confidence  of  market 
participants in risk management practices. Nay, there are three major barriers to the definition 
and enforcement of a standard disclosure framework. The first and most significant impediment 
is the poor understanding of ‘economic valuation’: a core concept.  Accountants and financial 
economists have spent decades developing tools to appreciate the economic value of real and 
financial assets. Still, hurdles persist in their application [2]. The second wall is the evolution of 
the structural architecture of the financial service industry: because banks are most likely to be 
regulated by different supervisory authorities and therefore subject to distinct accounting rules, 
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standardization of  disclosure  regulations  may  not  necessarily  yield  desired  effects.  Though 
globalization  may  promote  standardization,  national  and  cultural  barriers  weaken  its 
enforcement.  The third barrier is the rapid pace of innovation in the risk management area [3].
1.3 The scope of the current evaluation framework for risk management disclosure
      The  purpose  of  the  present  study is  to  evaluate  post-crisis  bank LRM disclosure 
measures.  The research seeks to  evaluate  if  in the aftermath  of the recent  financial  crisis,  a 
panic(moral hazard) from shareholders, financial analysts, creditors, clients and other interested 
parties (who rely on some quality and consistency in bank liquidity risk management disclosure) 
could be allayed given quickly searchable information on the management of liquidity risk. The 
work  adopts  the  World  Wide  Web  (hence  WWW) as  a  source  of  information  on  financial 
statements and annual reports for three important reasons. Firstly, given the global character of 
banks and market  participants,  the  WWW remains  the  primary  publicly  available  source  of 
information.  Secondly,  misleading  publication  and  inaccurate  disclosure  can  easily  be 
scrutinized by a wide audience.  Thirdly, while financial statements and periodical reports may 
be infrequent, quick revelation and wide dissemination of latest risk management measures and 
disclosure practices could be made via the WWW. 
    Within this framework of risk management disclosure, this research deliberately limits the 
risk category to liquidity. Our choice is motivated by the pre-crisis Basel Committee report on 
LRM and supervisory challenges which somehow warned of an ensuing financial crisis [4]. 
2. Literature on liquidity risk management disclosure
2.1 Literature on liquidity risk management
Measuring and managing liquidity go hand-in-glove. A good liquidity monitoring and 
measurement policy determines more or less management decisions on bank liquidity positions 
on an on-going basis,  especially in periods of adverse scenarios like financial  crisis.  A very 
recent example of bank periodical liquidity management could be borrowed from Merrouche and 
Schanz (2010).Their study which focused on the U.K payment system suggested that early in the 
day, when settlement banks are not sure that their counter-parties to whom they make payments  
would pay-back, they stop doing so. In this wise, healthy banks remain unaffected by disruptions 
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caused by operation outage, thus preventing affected banks acting as liquidity sinks. Generally, a 
bank with operational outage receives money both from the central banks and other banks but is 
unable to make payments due to more or less information and/or technology issues which could 
pose a systematic risk if not sufficiently monitored at the beginning of the day.
Concerning the use of market positions, Dinger (2009) has tested a hypothesis resulting 
from the works of Demirgüc-Kunt et al.  (1998) and Detregiache & Gupta (2004). The thesis 
supported by these authors suggests foreign banks have a stabilizing impact because they have 
access to diversified international sources of liquidity. Dinger on his part has presented evidence 
to justify the significant  difference in behavior between transitional  and local  banks. He has 
asserted that during stable periods transnational banks hold less liquid reserves than local banks 
and during crisis  hold more liquid reserves.  Dinger (2009) has further presented evidence to 
show how transnational  banks  smooth  the  local  money  market  volatility  in  small  emerging 
economies and also help in integration of interbank markets. Much earlier, Qian et al. (2004) had 
looked into the problem from the perspective of a financial system design. In comparing banks in 
a  dynamic  economy,  they found-out both the banking system and the market  could provide 
partial  liquidity  insurance  to  investors.  Evidence  suggested  a  full-participation  market  with 
intergenerational  trading could provide more  liquidity  and insurance  through wealth  transfer 
across generations.
With regard to contingency planning, Ratnovski (2009) recently stressed the need for a 
good lender of last resort policy which should incorporate bank capital information and reduce 
distorting rents. This sub-optimal liquidity solution could be very costly in terms of rents if a 
proper assessment of assets is not taking into account. Therefore, in compliance with this last 
resort lender requirement, he has recommended much focus on ex-post positive capitalization 
than ex-ante liquidity. To put this perspective clear, banks with positive liquidity ex-ante of crisis 
that the central bank supports may not necessarily have positive net worth ex-post, making sub-
optimal  liquidity  solutions  based  on  ex-ante  liquidity  positions  unsustainable  ex-post.  It  is 
therefore  in  the  banks  interest  to  insure  this  policy  is  not  conditioned  on  liquidity  but  on 
ascertained net worth, since quantitative liquidity requirement is very expensive. 
Looking at  the  weight  of  country specific  effects  on LRM disclosure,  Vento and La 
Ganga (2009) have pointed out; disparity in regulatory and supervisory regimes across countries 
could significantly affect bank LRM and supervision. Our work will also seek to investigate if 
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banks established in certain  countries have a specific  disclosure pattern.  Concerning cultural 
specific effects, it is worthwhile laying some emphasis on Islamic banks. Most recently, Ismal 
(2010) in an empirical survey on the Indonesian Islamic banking industry has indentified rational 
depositors’  sensitivity  to  interest  rate  return  and higher  portions  of  short-term deposits  (one 
month) as the main sources of liquidity problems. Meanwhile liquidity instruments which help in 
attenuating  these  liquidity  issues  include  (in  decreasing  order):  borrowing  from the  Islamic 
money market,  borrowing from parent  company,  withdrawing private  placements  from other 
banks, use of bank capital to cover demanded liquidity, selling of Islamic securities in secondary 
market, asking for depositors to wait for extra days and use of intra day emergency liquidity 
facility. 
2.2 Literature on bank information disclosure
The need for qualitative information  disclosure has been the subject of an increasing 
stream  of  academic  research  on  the  value  added  to  market  participants  by  increased 
transparency. For instance in an imperfect market, it has been made underlined that financial 
analysts  cannot  perfectly  substitute  for  the  deficiency  of  bank  disclosure  policy.  Numerous 
explanations offered in the finance literature for the willingness of banks to disclose complete 
and timely information point to the advantage of reducing transaction cost and thus the banks 
cost of capital[5]. In a financial industry in which services are close substitutes, banks whose 
benefits from disclosure exceed a certain threshold level of disclosure-cost will provide timely 
and  accurate  disclosures  (Gibson,  1999;  Verrechia,  1990).  It  logically  follows  that  risk 
management  disclosure policy of  leading banks and financial  firms  may be considered  as  a 
reputation device. 
In the risk management  practices  of  a financial  institution,  disclosure also requires  a 
delicate balance between conflicting goals. For instance, a high level of information asymmetry 
and moral hazard could encourage a universal bank to improve its disclosure quality in a bid to  
reduce higher cost of capital  when issuing new securities.  On the other side of the coin, the 
intensity of competitive threats in the banking industry or the fear of take-over combined with 
inadequate  managerial  incentives  could  discourage  increased  disclosure.  Disclosure  quality 
could  also  vary based on whether  the  bank aims  to  avoid  implicit  or  explicit  costs  (higher  
regulatory capital and/or market sanctions). 
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 Added value of increased transparency has been considered in many studies (Brown and 
Han, 1992). This study provided evidence that transparency promotes greater convergence of 
beliefs and significantly ameliorates the accuracy of analyst earning forecasts. Results from the 
study showed: the quality of disclosure support the conjecture that public information brings 
about convergence of beliefs which leads to more complete markets that in-turn improve risk-
sharing.  The  positive  association  of  transparency  in  disclosure  with  market  improvement  is 
questioned by some authors.   
 Chen and Hassan (2006) have demonstrated that if banking transparency is improved by 
increasing the precision of public signals [6], this may increase the likelihood of a contagious 
bank-run. Beside this  inauspicious  account  of transparency,  it  is  worthwhile  disclosing other 
definitions for ‘improvement of transparency’ exist. For instance, if transparency is defined as 
the way the banking system ameliorates the manner in which depositors know whether problems 
of failed banks are systematic or idiosyncratic in nature, then improvement of transparency from 
this angle should instead dwarf a contagious run. The skepticism of Chen and Hassan (2006) on 
transparency related to the improvement of public signals was shared by  Cordella and Yeyati 
(1998) who posited that full transparency of bank risks could lead to bank failure via increasing 
interest on deposits that could accrue from riskier positions.  The effect of this disclosure risk 
was further  emphasized  by Admati  and Pfleiderer  (2000) who assessed that  when firms are 
positively correlated, disclosing information on one could affect others especially if the revealed 
information can trigger a contagious run. A study which somewhat antagonizes this thesis is 
from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008). They found out, banks in countries which better comply with 
Basel Core Principles related to information provision receive more favorable Moody financial 
strength ratings. 
Regarding what type of information this research might be concerned with,  Boot and 
Thakor (2001) in asking the kind of information firms should voluntarily reveal, considered three 
types of disclosures: (1) information that complements that available only to informed investors; 
(2) information that complements that available to all investors; (3) a substitute to information 
that informed investors would have obtained themselves. From the perspective of this study, our 
search for information from the World Wide Web falls within the first and second categories. 
The third information category is ruled-out because “inside information can hardly be obtained 
from a public source”. Therefore, the present work will aim to: (1) verify if banks have adopted 
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more  appealing  post-crisis  disclosure  principles  on  LRM  (Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision, February 2008); (2) investigate if country regulatory and supervisory regimes play a 
role in determining disclosure patterns (Vento and La Ganga, 2009); and finally (3) determine 
summarily whether such explicit disclosure is relevant for stakeholder confidence (as opposed to 
Chen and Hassan, 2006).  
3. Methods
3.1 Content search 
By ‘content’, the paper refers to information on LRM. As shown in Table I below, the 20 
selected banks are among the top 33 in terms of asset value according to a recent classification 
[7]. Chosen banks are selected such that their headquarters are in countries which are members 
of the Basel Committee.  The work relies  principally on the WWW for information because: 
firstly,  it  is  the  most  widely  accessible  source  of  information  to  present  and  potential 
stakeholders (clients, shareholders and other market participants) and secondly, most banks have 
an international character which makes the web and particularly their websites the turning point 
of most information about them. For every bank under consideration we sacrifice at least one 
hour  in  search  for  LRM  information.  This  is  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the  research 
hypothetically assumes,  on average a market participant should spend approximately such an 
amount of time perusing for LRM information. On the WWW and corresponding websites, the 
paper  uses  searching  sentences  like:  “liquidity  risk  management”,  “cash  risk  management”, 
“liquidity  management”,  “cash  management”,  “liquidity  risk”,  “Basel  II  pillar  3  disclosure”, 
“Basel  II”,  “pillar  disclosure”…..etc.  Targeted  content  from  annual  reports  is  post-2008, 
implying the research focuses on analyzing annual reports  of financial  institutions  that  were 
published after the start of the recent financial crisis. 
3.2 Content analysis  
This is a form of qualitative analysis that deals specifically with documents and texts. 
Interpreting and understanding ‘disclosures’ the work finds falls  within this  framework.  The 
paper  endeavors  to  verify  how  information  found  reflects  underlying  disclosure  principles 
(according to Basel II-pillar 3) which should include: risk identification and assessment;  risk 
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management and mitigation; and risk monitoring and reporting. Therefore, the research focuses 
on the following when perusing and analyzing a particular content:
-development  of  a  structure  for  managing  liquidity  (strategic  risk  management,  tactical  risk 
management, adequacy of information system, managing structure of liquidity strategy, role of 
directors and day-to-day LRM);  
-measurement and management of net funding requirements (establishment of a measuring and 
monitoring  process,  use  of  “what  if”  scenarios,  and  review  of  liquidity  management 
assumptions);
-management of market access and contingency planning (managing market access, contingency 
planning, and stress testing and scenario analysis are necessary) and 
-last but not the least criterion- the role of internal control, supervisors and public disclosure in 
improving liquidity management;
 
Table I. Presentation of selected banks
Banks World 
Rankings°
Assets (million 
US$)
Capital
(million US$)
 1) BNP Paribas S.A(France) 1st 2,952,221 35,955.52
 2)Royal Bank of Scotland(United Kingdom) 2nd 2,739,361 23,623.45
 3)Credit Agricole(France) 3rd 2,234,350 40,648.49
 4)Barclays Bank Plc(United Kingdom) 4th 2,226,593   4,606.81
 5)Deutsche  Bank(Germany) 5th 2,153,033   2,279.77
 6)Lloyds Banking Group plc(United Kingdom) 6th 1,658,736 16,909.41
 7)JP Morgan Chase and Co.(USA) 7th 1,627,684   1,785.00
 8)Banco Santander S.A(Spain) 8th 1,593,298   5,902.44
 9)The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi(Japan) 9th 1,494,350  12,000.15
10)Société Générale(France) 10th 1,468,725    1,327.12
11)Bank of America-Merrill Lynch(USA) 11th 1,468,725    1,327.12
12)ING(Netherlands) 12th 1,441,673       731.50
13)UBS(Switzerland) 15th 1,296,709       344.36
14)Bank of China(China) 16th 1,281,409   37,181.63
15)The Sumitomo Bank(Japan) 20th 1,162,096     6,670.54
16)Citibank(USA) 21st 1,161,361        751.00
17)Bank of Scotland plc (United Kingdom) 23rd 1,067,890     9,441.30
18)Credit Suisse(Switzerland) 25th    997,705          45.46
19)Banca Intesa(Italy) 26th     896,476     9,525.11
20)ABN Ambro Holding NV(Netherlands) 33rd     673,379     2,657.10
Notes: °Rankings as of 11th of August 2010. Figures are consolidated and date on 31/12/2009. All countries above 
are members of the Basel Committee. U.S.A: United States of America. Source (Bankers Almanac).
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Table II. Banks and Liquidity Risk Management Disclosure (LRMD)
Implicit or No  LRMD Explicit LRMD
BNP Paribas S.A(France) Deutsche  Bank(Germany)
Royal Bank of Scotland(United Kingdom) UBS(Switzerland)
Credit Agricole(France) Barclays Bank Plc(United Kingdom)
JP Morgan Chase and Co.(USA) Lloyds Banking Group plc(United Kingdom)
Banco Santander S.A(Spain) ING(Netherlands)
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi(Japan)
Société Générale(France)
Bank of America-Merrill Lynch(USA)
Bank of China(China)
The Sumitomo Bank(Japan)
Citibank(USA)
Bank of  Scotland plc(United Kingdom)
Credit Suisse(Switzerland)
Banca Intesa(Italy)
ABN Ambro Holding NV(Netherlands) 
Notes: U.S.A: United States of America. Source (author’s synthesis)
4. Case Studies
Various  case  studies  are  analyzed  based  on  whether  bank  websites  and  the  WWW 
provide explicit information on LRM. As summarized in Table II, while fifteen banks do not 
have  accessible  information,  five  do.  Banks  with  implicit  LRM information  mostly  provide 
details on what they could do to help clients manage their liquidity. Their information is meant to 
inform clients on how well their deposits could be managed profitably than, on what measures 
they would take to ensure depositors are refunded upon demand (prevention of liquidity risk). 
They use terms like :“we offer services to help you: consolidate your balances, understand your 
daily cash position, address short and long term research objectives, self direct or automate your 
investments…etc”(Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, for example). Analyzed explicit disclosures 
are synthesized in tables III, IV, V, and VI below.
10
Table III. Developing a structure for managing liquidity
Liquidity 
Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank plc Lloyds Banking 
Group plc
ING
Day-to-day 
liquidity 
management 
strategy
“Our liquidity risk management 
approach starts at the intraday level 
(operational liquidity) managing the 
daily payments queue, forecasting cash 
flows and factoring in our access to 
Central Banks”.
“UBS continuously 
tracks its liquidity 
position and asset 
and liability profile 
over time”  “In 
response to the 
market dislocation 
discussed above, 
UBS increased both 
its modeling and 
monitoring 
frequency”.
“The Group policy is that each operation 
must ensure that it has access to sufficient 
intraday liquidity to meet any obligations it 
may have to clearing and settlement 
systems”.
“Daily monitoring 
and control processes 
are in place to 
address both 
statutory and 
prudential liquidity 
requirements.”
“ALCO Bank has delegated 
day-to-day liquidity 
management to Financial 
Markets Amsterdam, which is 
responsible for managing the 
overall liquidity risk position of 
ING Bank…”  
“Within Financial Markets the 
focus is mainly on the daily and 
intraday cash and collateral 
positions and it is policy to 
sufficiently stagger day-to-day 
funding requirements”;
Role of directors
“The underlying policy, including the 
bank’s risk tolerance, is reviewed and 
approved regularly by the Management 
Board. The policy defines the liquidity 
risk limits which are applied to the 
Group”.
n.s.a n.s.a “Routine reporting is 
in place to senior 
management and 
through the Group's 
committee structure”
n.s.a
Management 
structure for 
liquidity strategy
-Short term liquidity
-Unsecured funding
-Asset liquidity
-Stress testing and Scenario analysis
n.s.a “Barclays Treasury operates a centralized 
governance and
control process that covers all of the 
Group’s liquidity risk
Management activities”. 
-the group asset and 
liability committee 
-the senior asset and 
liability committee
-structural liquidity risk
-tactical liquidity risk
-contingent liquidity risk
Adequate 
Information 
system.
“Our cash flow based reporting system 
provides daily liquidity risk information 
to global and regional management”.
n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a
Tactical risk 
management
“It then covers tactical liquidity risk 
management dealing with the access to 
secured and unsecured funding sources”.
n.s.a “Execution of the Group's liquidity risk 
management strategy is carried out at 
country level within agreed policies, 
controls and limits, with the Country 
Treasurer providing reports directly to 
Barclays Treasury to evidence conformance 
with the agreed risk profile”
n.s.a “From a tactical, short-term 
perspective the liquidity risk 
resulting from the short term 
cash and collateral positions is 
managed”.
Strategic risk 
management
“Finally, the strategic perspective 
comprises the maturity profile of all 
assets and liabilities (Funding Matrix) on 
our balance sheet and our issuance 
strategy”.
n.s.a “The objective of the Group's liquidity risk 
management strategy is to ensure that the 
funding profile of individual businesses and 
the Group as a whole is appropriate to 
underlying market conditions and the 
profile of our business in each given 
country.”
n.s.a n.s.a
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis)
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Table IV. Measuring and monitoring net funding requirements
Liquidity Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds Banking Group 
plc
ING
Establishment of 
measuring and 
monitoring process 
“Our reporting system tracks 
cash flows on a daily basis 
over an 18-month horizon. 
This system allows 
management to assess our 
short-term liquidity position in 
each location, region and 
globally on a by-currency, by-
product and by-division basis. 
The system captures all of our 
cash flows from transactions 
on our balance sheet, as well 
as liquidity risks resulting 
from off-balance sheet 
transactions”.
n.s.a “The need to monitor, manage 
and control intraday liquidity 
in real time is recognized by 
the Group as a critical process: 
any failure to meet specific 
intraday commitments would 
have significant consequences, 
such as a visible market 
disruption”.
“Liquidity is actively 
monitored at business unit and 
Group level at an appropriate 
frequency. Routine reporting 
is in place to senior 
management and through the 
Group's committee structure, 
in particular the group asset 
and liability committee and 
the senior asset and liability 
committee which meet 
monthly”.
“For the measurement and 
monitoring of the actual 
liquidity position the focus is 
on the daily cash and collateral 
position”.
Use of “what if” 
scenarios.
“In addition, we keep a 
dedicated strategic liquidity 
reserve containing highly 
liquid and central bank 
eligible securities in major 
currencies around the world to 
support our liquidity profile in 
case of potential deteriorating 
market conditions”.
n.s.a “These stress scenarios 
include Barclays-specific 
scenarios such as an 
unexpected rating downgrade 
and operational problems, and 
external scenarios such as 
Emerging Market crises, 
payment system disruption 
and macro-economic shocks”.
“Firstly, the Group stress tests 
its potential cash flow 
mismatch position under 
various scenarios on an 
ongoing basis”.
“For this purpose ING Bank’s 
weekly and monthly liquidity 
positions are stress tested 
under a scenario that is a mix 
between a market event and an 
ING specific event”.
Review of liquidity 
management 
assumptions.
“As of year-end 2009 we have 
implemented a new reporting 
system which focuses on 
contractual cash flows from 
wholesale funding sources on 
a daily basis over a 12-month 
horizon”.
n.s.a n.s.a “The scenarios and the 
assumptions are reviewed at 
least annually to gain 
assurance they continue to be 
relevant to the nature of the 
business”.
n.s.a
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis)
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Table V. Managing market access and contingency planning
Liquidity 
Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds Banking Group 
plc
ING
Managing 
market access
“Unsecured funding is measured on a 
regional basis by currency and 
aggregated to a global utilization report. 
The management board approves limits 
to protect our access to unsecured 
funding at attractive 
levels”…….“Liquidity outflow limits 
(Maximum Cash Outflow Limits), 
which have been set to limit cumulative 
global and local cash outflows, are 
monitored on a daily basis to safeguard 
our access to liquidity”.
n.s.a “The Group maintains a 
portfolio of highly marketable 
assets including UK, US and 
Euro-area government bonds 
that can be sold or funded on a 
secured basis as protection 
against any unforeseen 
interruption to cash flow.”
“Additionally, unsecured 
funding is managed within 
specific term limits. The term 
of unsecured liabilities has 
been extended, with average 
life improving by four months 
from eight months at the end 
of December 2007 to 12 
months at the end of 
December 2008”.
n.s.a “Holding a broad portfolio of 
highly marketable assets that 
can be used to obtain secured 
funding”.
 “Maintaining an adequate 
structural liquidity gap taking 
into account the asset mix and 
both the secured and 
unsecured funding 
possibilities of ING Bank”.
Contingency 
planning
“The strategic liquidity reserve amounts 
to EUR 54.9 billion as of December 31, 
2009. This reserve is held in addition to 
the bank’s cash balance and the 
collateral the bank needs to support its 
clearing activities in euro, U.S. dollars 
and other currencies which are held in 
separate portfolios around the globe”.
“Combined with the broad 
diversity of its funding 
sources, its contingency 
planning processes and its 
global scope, these additional 
measures have proven 
extremely helpful in enabling 
UBS to maintain a balanced 
asset / liability profile, in spite 
of this period of 
unprecedented market 
dislocation”.
“The output informs both the 
liquidity mismatch limits and 
the Group's contingency 
funding plan. This is 
maintained by Treasury and is 
aligned with the Group and 
country business resumption 
plans to encompass decision-
making authorities, internal 
and external communication 
and, in the event of a systems 
failure, the restoration of 
liquidity management and 
payment systems”.
“the Group has a contingency 
funding plan embedded within 
the Group Liquidity Policy 
which has been designed to 
identify emerging liquidity 
concerns at an early stage, so 
that mitigating actions can be 
taken to avoid a more serious 
crisis developing”.
“Contingency liquidity risk 
relates to the organization and 
planning for liquidity 
management in times of stress. 
Within ING a specific crisis 
team is responsible for the 
liquidity management in times 
of crisis”.
Stress testing
“Stress testing is fully integrated in our 
liquidity risk management framework. 
We track contractual cash flows per 
currency and product over an eight-week 
horizon (which we consider the most 
critical time span in a liquidity crisis) 
and apply the relevant stress case to all 
potential risk drivers from on balance 
sheet and off balance sheet products. 
Beyond the eight week time horizon we 
analyze on a quarterly basis the impact 
of a change of business model out to 12 
“This involves monitoring its 
contractual and behavioral 
maturity profiles, projecting 
and modeling its liquidity 
exposures under various stress 
scenarios and monitoring its 
secured funding capacity.”
“Stress testing is undertaken 
to assess and plan for the 
impact of various scenarios 
which may put the Group's 
liquidity at risk.” 
"Treasury develops and 
monitors a range of stress tests 
on the Group's projected cash 
flows. These stress scenarios 
include Barclays-specific 
“the Group stress tests its 
potential cash flow mismatch 
position under various 
scenarios on an ongoing 
basis.”
“Behavioral adjustments are 
developed, evaluating how the 
cash flow position might 
change under each stress 
scenario to derive a stressed 
cash flow position. Scenarios 
cover both Lloyds Banking 
“For stress testing purposes 
the liquidity risk positions are 
calculated in line with the 
regulatory reporting 
requirements for liquidity risk 
of the Dutch Central Bank”.
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months. The liquidity stress testing 
provides the basis for the bank’s 
contingency funding plans which are 
approved by the Management Board. 
Our stress testing analysis assesses our 
ability to generate sufficient liquidity 
under critical conditions and has been a 
valuable input when defining our target 
liquidity risk position. The analysis is 
performed monthly”.
scenarios such as an 
unexpected rating downgrade 
and operational problems, and 
external scenarios such as 
Emerging Market crises, 
payment system disruption 
and macro-economic shocks. 
The output informs both the 
liquidity mismatch limits and 
the Group's contingency 
funding plan.” 
Group name specific and 
systemic difficulties”.
Scenario 
analysis
“As of year-end 2009 we also have 
introduced a scenario which combines a 
systemic market shock with a multi 
notch rating downgrade. 
Under each of these scenarios we 
assume that all maturing loans to 
customers will need to be rolled over 
and require funding whereas rollover of 
liabilities will be partially impaired 
resulting in a funding gap. We then 
model the steps we would take to 
counterbalance the resulting net shortfall 
in funding. Countermeasures would 
include the bank’s long cash balance and 
unencumbered asset inventory as well as 
our Strategic Liquidity Reserve”….. 
“The scenarios have been based on 
historic events, such as the 1987 stock 
market crash, the 1990 U.S. liquidity 
crunch and the September 2001 terrorist 
attacks, liquidity crisis case studies and 
hypothetical events. Also incorporated 
are new liquidity risk drivers revealed 
by the latest financial markets crisis: 
prolonged term money-market freeze, 
collateral repudiation, limited fungibility 
of currencies, stranded syndications, 
systemic knock-on effects and further 
liquidity risk drivers such as intraday 
liquidity risk”.
“This involves monitoring its 
contractual and behavioral 
maturity profiles, projecting 
and modeling its liquidity 
exposures under various stress 
scenarios and monitoring its 
secured funding capacity”.
“For this purpose ING Bank’s 
weekly and monthly liquidity 
positions are stress tested 
under a scenario that is a mix 
between a market event and an 
ING specific event.”
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis)
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 Table VI. Role of internal control, supervisors and public disclosure, in improving liquidity risk management
Liquidity Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds Banking Group 
plc
ING
Internal control
“As of year-end 2009 we have 
implemented a new reporting 
system which focuses on 
contractual cash flows from 
wholesale funding sources on 
a daily basis over a 12-month 
horizon. The system captures 
all cash flows from unsecured 
as well as from secured 
funding transactions. 
Wholesale funding limits, 
which are calibrated against 
our stress testing results and 
approved by the Management 
Board; describe our maximum 
tolerance for liquidity risk. 
These limits apply to the 
cumulative global cash 
outflows and are monitored on 
a daily basis”.
n.s.a n.s.a “Liquidity is actively 
monitored at business unit and 
Group level at an appropriate 
frequency. Routine reporting 
is in place to senior 
management and through the 
Group's committee structure, 
in particular the group asset 
and liability committee and 
the senior asset and liability 
committee which meet 
monthly”.
n.s.a
Role of supervisors
Management directors are 
mentioned three times in a 
supervising role. No 
intermediate supervisors are 
disclosed.
n.s.a n.s.a “Routine reporting is in place 
to senior management and 
through the Group's 
committee structure, in 
particular the group asset and 
liability committee and the 
senior asset and liability 
committee which meet 
monthly. In a stress situation 
the level of monitoring and 
reporting is increased 
commensurate with the nature 
of the stress event”.
n.s.a
Public disclosure  World Wide Web World Wide Web World Wide Web World Wide Web World Wide Web
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis)
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5. Discussion of Results 
5.1 Brief discussion of results
Much discussion on analyzed content of disclosures would be monotonous, as it would 
simply be literally  recycling  what  is  already much explicit  and self  explanatory in synthetic 
tables (III,  IV, V and VI). For instance with respect to Table III (developing a structure for 
managing liquidity), Deutsche Bank appears to provide the most exhaustive information. On a 
positive note, all five banks take very seriously, an intra-day LRM strategy. But for Deutsche 
Bank,  the  presence  of  an  adequate  information  system is  seldom elucidated.  Regarding  net 
funding requirements, only UBS is on the sideline as compared to other banks. However this 
difference is not any relevant when it comes to ‘market access and contingency-planning’, which 
is taking seriously by all banks. Only Deutsche Bank and Lloyds Banking Group Plc account for 
the  ‘role  of  internal  control,  supervisors  and  public  disclosure,  in  improving  liquidity 
management’. 
5.2 Detailed discussion of results
5.2.1 Developing a structure for managing liquidity
 In  the  post  credit-crunch-environment,  much  spotlight  has  been  thrown  on  intraday 
liquidity  facilities.  Once  taken  for  granted,  day-to-day  liquidity  management  measures  have 
become the symbol of changing relationships between banks and clients in cash management and 
of  the  challenges  still  inherent  in  the  global  credit  system.  As  shown  in  Table  III,  banks 
increasingly  understand  their  clients  need to  fine-tune  their  intra-day liquidity  requirements. 
Consequently,  many banks are  facing increasing  challenges  with regard to  intraday liquidity 
management in relation to their own activities as well as those of their customer firms and other  
financial  institutions.  Thus  the  five  banks  above  (in  their  intraday  liquidity  management 
disclosure  policies)  understand  that  their  failure  in  meeting  timely  critical  payments  could 
transmit liquidity shock to other financial institutions domestically and internationally. Deutsche 
Bank stretches its disclosure even further by stressing the need for factoring-in access to central 
banks. This suggests Deutsche Bank could be participating in a Real Time Gross Settlement  
System-type (RTGS) in ensuring the smooth functioning of its system [8]. 
16
Disclosure  of  roles  of  directors/supervisors  in  LRM  is  less  pronounced.  Supervisors 
and/or  directors  need to  regularly perform a comprehensive  assessment  of  the  banks overall 
LRM framework and liquidity position, monitor a combination of internal reports, prudential 
reports and market information, intervene regularly for effective and timely remedial action by a 
bank to address deficiencies in the LRM process and liquidity position. Only Deutsche Bank and 
Lloyds Banking Group Plc seem to meet this disclosure criterion. 
Looking at  the management  structure for liquidity risk, while Barclays  Bank Plc and 
Lloyds Banking Group Plc provide information in terms of governance and/or power structure, 
Deutsche Bank and ING are keener to disclosing information on LRM based on types of risks. 
While almost similar strategies [9] are applied by Deutsche Bank and Barclays, tactics employed 
differ from one bank to the other. Tactical LRM is based on country segmentation (Barclays),  
security of funding sources (Deutsche) as well as short-term cash and collateral positions(ING). 
5.2.2 Measuring and monitoring net funding requirements 
But for UBS bank, each of the four other financial institutions use “what if” scenarios in 
analyzing liquidity as well as a sound “process for ongoing measuring and monitoring of net 
funding requirements”. As illustrated in  Table IV, the later process consists of managing and 
monitoring intraday liquidity. In scenario analysis bank specific events (e.g unexpected ratings 
downgrade, operational problem…etc) and unanticipated market events (e.g emerging markets 
crises, payment disruptions, macro economic shocks…etc) are used on an ongoing basis. The 
benefit of these scenarios is their ability to indentify activities in different circumstances and 
summarize  overall  results  with  modest  data  requirements,  greater  comprehensibility  and 
simplicity. It further enables liquidity risk managers improve the classification and ranking of 
possible risk events. In a design to increase the probability that all major risk factors/deliverables 
are accounted for accordingly,  liquidity management assumptions are often reviewed.  These 
scenarios and assumptions could either be reviewed at least once a year (Lloyds) or within an 
unspecified interval (Deutsche). 
5.2.3 Managing market access and contingency planning
Each financial institution should periodically review its efforts to establish and maintain 
relationships with liability holders as well as ensure its capacity to sell assets. In a bid to achieve 
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these  goals,  Deutsche  B,  Barclays  and  ING  managed  ‘secured  and  unsecured  funding 
possibilities’ are rigorously analyzed. More so, an international portfolio of highly marketable 
securities  ensures  an  unforeseen  interruption  of  cash  flows  (Barclays)  or  secured  funding 
sources(ING).  Deutsche  B  on  its  part  avoids  this  problem by  limiting  access  to  unsecured 
funding.   Since  a  banks future  liquidity  could be affected  by factors  that  cannot  always  be 
forecasted with precision, assumptions need to be revised frequently to determine their continued 
validity, especially when changes in the markets are quite fast. 
Contingency funding plans may stretch from a strategic liquidity reserve (Deutsche) to 
organization  and  planning  in  times  of  stress(ING),  through  policies  designed  to  identify 
emerging  liquidity  concerns  at  an early stage (Lloyds).  Also,  stress  testing  is  undertaken to 
assess and plan for the effects of various funding needs that may put the bank’s liquidity at risk. 
These tests aimed at projecting cash flows are almost alike for all five financial institutions with 
Deutsche going much further in providing the periodicity of such tests.  Scenario analysis which 
is part and parcel of the process of managing market access and contingency planning has been 
elaborately covered in Section 5.2.2. 
5.2.4 Role of internal control, supervisors and public disclosure in improving LRM
Public disclosure aims to improve transparency, reduce uncertainty in the markets, ease 
valuations  and  strengthen  market  discipline.  More  so  banks  should  have  adequate  internal 
controls to guarantee the integrity of their liquidity risk management process. Information on 
internal control and the role of supervisors is provided by Deutsche B. and Lloyds with emphasis 
placed on the management board and management committees respectively. Adequate internal 
controls ensure the integrity of their LRM process.   
5.3 Liquidity risk management disclosure propositions  
Proposition 1: The disclosure of LRM practices should incorporate a virtual framework so as 
to  enhance  confidence  in  market  participants  in  the  willingness  of  the  bank  to  provide 
information about risk exposures as well as efforts to check and manage them with respect to  
targeted risk and equity profiles. 
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The virtual world today cannot be undermined in the process of LRM disclosure. Making 
available  information via WWW would only decrease negative market  perceptions related to 
rumors and market manipulation initiatives. 
Proposition 2: LRM disclosure policy should be such that bank stakeholders can  easily have 
access to information within a minimum spell of time. 
There mere provision of information is not enough. Such should be easily consultable by 
market participants. Web design should be such that it takes maximum speed and ease (using 
common search-terms and “tags”) to get desired information on LRM. 
Proposition 3: Disclosure of the bank liquidity position and policy should also be numerically 
(quantitatively) elaborated and not simply based on a recycle of information on Basel II pillar 
3 disclosure principles. 
Providing ‘figures’ to stakeholders via the WWW could allay negative sentiments in the 
run-up to banking/financial crisis. Quantitative data should be modestly robust and designed with 
simplicity for greater comprehensibility.
Proposition 4:  Virtual  disclosure  of  LRM  policy  should  be  complete. That  is,  it  should 
incorporate and appropriately weight all elements of Basel II disclosure principles. 
This would ease risk assessment and decrease moral hazard (and adverse selection) issues 
related to partial disclosures. 
5.4 Relation with previous studies and future directions
As we must have emphasized in the introductory part of this paper, the disclosure of 
liquidity risk requires bank management to identity,  measure and monitor its positions on an 
ongoing basis as well as examine how funding requirements are likely to evolve under various 
scenarios (including adverse conditions).However, in the light of findings here-in the inability of 
financial  institutions  to  effect  full  LRM disclosure could  be understood from Vento and La 
Ganga(2009) as expressed by  Persaud (2007): “liquidity is difficult to define and even more  
difficult to measure”. Therefore measuring liquidity risk can be a challenge, mainly because the 
underlying variables driving the exposures can be dynamic and unpredictable. It follows that if 
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liquidity is difficult to define and measure, it is even harder to publicly disclose how it is defined, 
measured  and  managed.  The  low  rate  of  bank  disclosure  confirms  a  study  by  Chen  and 
Hassan(2006) which showed that banks do not take seriously improvements in transparency of 
the banking system because, it could breed chances of a contagious bank-run. Our results also 
comply with Cordella and Yeyati  (1998) in the perspective that full  disclosure of bank risks 
could lead to bank failure through increasing interest rate. A further emphasis on the relevance of 
results with respect to the literature could be appreciated from Adamti and Pfleiderer (2000) who 
had earlier shown that disclosure of negative information could engender a contagious run and 
systematic  collapse,  especially  when  correlation  between  elements  of  the  banking  sector  is 
highly positive.  
This research has highlighted the LRM disclosure atmosphere existing in top-ranking (the 
upper-bracket  of)  global  financial  institutions.  Its  contribution  to  the  literature  on  risk 
management is for the most part informative. Based on the findings and given the increasing 
integration of financial markets and shortening of intervals between global financial crises, the 
following future research directions could help elucidate why financial institutions disclose less:
-if  strict  disclosure requirements  lead to  liquid  and efficient  markets  and reduce the cost  of 
capital  of financial institutions,  why don’t banks do it voluntarily? In other words, if lack of 
disclosure is considered as “bad news” why are financial institutions so slow to act?
-do financial institutions disclose less in terms of LRM due to the difficulty in defining and 
measuring the concept of liquidity(especially  underlying variables driving the exposures which 
could be dynamic and unpredictable)?
-is the lack of full LRM disclosure due to the cost associated with producing and disseminating 
information? That is the need for certification by third parties (accounting firms for instance) and 
loses in competitive advantage or bargaining power in various contexts;
-is the price paid by financial institutions in times of crisis (due to incomplete LRM disclosure) 
inferior to the benefits resulting from partial disclosure in normal times?     
The  light  of  above  concerns  could  significantly  improve  our  understanding  of why 
financial institutions are “forced to talk”. 
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6. Conclusion
Our assessment of post-crisis liquidity risk management disclosures following pre-crisis 
shortcomings emphasized by the Basel committee on banking supervision has yielded results not 
unexpected. In verifying the hypotheses we brought forward at the onset of this work, we can 
conclude: (1) with respect to the World Wide Web, banks have not adopted more appealing post-
crisis disclosure principles; (2) country regulatory systems don’t affect disclosure patterns ;(3) 
disclosure doesn’t seem to be any relevant in determining the content of stakeholder confidence 
since banks do not still consider severe and prolonged liquidity disruptions as very likely.
As a policy implication, like in the run-up to the previous financial crisis, if banks 
are not compelled to explicitly and expressly disclose what  measures they adopt in a bid to 
guarantee  stakeholder  liquidity,  the  onset  of  any  financial  turmoil  would  only  precipitate  a 
meltdown. 
Notes
1. The report emphasized that banks did not have an adequate framework that ideally accounted for the liquidity risk  
presented by individual products and business lines.  Most banks did not take into consideration the amount of  
liquidity, crucial for contingency obligations.
2.  As  an  example,  mark-to-market  valuation  is  more  interesting  under  normal  market  conditions  than  book-
valuation.  However,  extending  it  to  on-and  off-balance  sheet  assets  poses  several  problems  (information 
asymmetries, absence of asset liquidity or underlying instrument, poorly quantifiable risk factors: operational, credit,  
legal, political…etc).
3. For instance some decades back, not much was understood about credit risk management.  However today, many 
financial institutions use internally developed credit risk models to manage counter risk exposures.
4. The report emphasized that banks had failed to take account of a number of fundamental principles of LRM. It  
further stressed many financial institutions did not conduct stress tests and scenario analyses because they did not  
consider severe and prolonged liquidity disruptions as very likely.  The ensuing financial meltdown justified and 
gave much credit to this report.
5. It reduces moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
6. For example, when banks invest at time ‘0’, public signals about the projects are revealed at time ‘1’. However,  
the time interval between investment and public knowledge could still be sub-divided.
7.  Rankings  as  of  11 August  2010.  From Bankers  Almanac.   Content  search  is  carried-out  between June  and 
December 2010.
8. For smooth functioning of systems, central banks generally offer intraday credit to participants of RTGS-type  
systems.
9. Based on maturity (Deutsche Bank) or business (Barclays Bank Plc) profiles.
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